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NEW MEXICAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE
SOCIEDAD ANONIMA PROMOTORA
DE INVERSION
Antonio Franck*

HE new Mexican Securities Market Law (L.M.V.) has created expectations and questions in the Mexican business sector. Among
different matters, the L.M.V. has introduced a new legal structure
with the purpose of encouraging investment and growth of the Mexican
securities market. An interesting innovation is the Sociedad An6nima
Promotora de Inversi6n (SAPI). 1 The SAPI is a regular Sociedad
An6nima (limited liability corporation) with a diverse list of exceptions to
the provisions of the General Law of Commercial Companies (L.G.S.M.).
The SAPI is intended to create a new culture of investment in Mexico
by adopting clear and workable corporate governance. Thereafter, by the
issuance of debt it may begin to attract investment through the securities
market and, in the future, become a fully registered and tradable corporation before the Mexican Stock Exchange by becoming a Sociedad
An6nima Bursdtil (fully registered limited liability corporation). This article will address important characteristics of the SAPI.
The current Sociedad An6nima incorporated pursuant to the L.G.S.M.
may become a SAPI by holding a General Extraordinary Shareholders
Meeting and by amending its bylaws (estatutos) as applicable. The corporate name of this type of corporation shall always be followed by the
words "Promotorade Inversi6n" or its abbreviation "P.1."2 The bylaws of
the SAPI may establish special provisions different to those contained in
the bylaws of a current Sociedad An6nima governed by the L.G.S.M.,
such as:
(i) Restrictions on transfer of shares, different from those provisions
contained in article 130 of the LG.S.M. 3;
Partner of the Securities, Corporate, and Financial Law practice groups at Haynes
and Boone, S.C. (Mexico City Office).
1. Ley del Mercado de Valores [L.M.V.] [Securities Market Law], Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.], 30 de Diciembre de 2005 (Mex.), availableat http://dof.gob.mx/
2005/diciembre/dof_30-12-2005.pdf. The new law became effective on June 28,
2006.
2. For example, La Lupita, S.A. de C.V.P.I.; La Lupita, S.A. de C.V. Promotora de
Inversi6n.
3. Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [L.G.S.M.] [Commercial Corporations
Law], as amended, art. 130, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Julio de
*

2006 (Mex.), available at http://dof.gob.mx/2006/julio/dof_28-07-2006.pdf.

"The

bylaws may provide that shares may only be transferred with the authorization of
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(ii) Causes of exclusion of shareholders or exercise of separation or
withdrawal rights, or mechanisms to buy back shares, as well as
formulas to determine the price of stock for any of such matters;
(iii) The issuance of four special classes of shares, different
from those
4
provided in articles 112 and 113 of the L.G.S.M.:
(a) Shares with no voting rights or with voting rights restricted
to certain matters only;
(b) Corporate and non-economic rights different from voting
rights;
(c) Limited or broadened dividends or other special economic
rights, an exception to the provision of article 17 of the
5
L.G.S.M.;
(d) Granted voting rights or voting rights requiring the
favorable vote of one or more shareholder regarding resolutions from the general shareholders meeting;
(iv) Implemented mechanisms to be followed in case the shareholders
do not reach an agreement in connection with specific matters;
(v) Increasing, limiting, or denying preemptive rights contained in article 132 of the L.G.S.M.;

6

the board of directors. The board may deny such authorization, designating a
buyer of the shares at the current market price."
4. Id. at arts. 112-13.
Shares shall be of equal value and shall confer equal rights.
Nevertheless, the organizational instrument may provide that the capital
be composed of various classes of shares with special rights pertaining to
each class, subject in all cases to the provisions of article 17.
Each share shall be entitled to only one vote, but the organizational instrument may provide that one part of the shares shall only have the
right to vote in extraordinary assemblies of shareholders held to consider
the matters contained in sections I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII of article 182.
Dividends may not be assigned to ordinary shares until shares with limited voting rights have been paid a dividend of five percent. When in a
fiscal year there are no dividends or the dividends are less than said five
percent, the shortfall shall be paid in subsequent fiscal years with the
priority indicated herein.
In the liquidation of the company, shares with limited voting rights shall
be repaid before ordinary shares. The organizational instrument may
provide for dividends for shares with limited voting rights superior to
dividends for ordinary shares.
The holders of shares with limited voting rights shall have the rights
which this law confers upon minorities with respect to contesting decisions made in shareholders' assemblies and reviewing the balance sheet
and books of the company.
5. Id. art. 17. "Provisions which exclude one or more partners or shareholders from
participating in gains shall have no legal effect whatsoever."
6. Id. art. 132.
Shareholders shall have pre-emptive rights to subscribe shares issued in
connection with an increase of the capital stock in proportion to the
number of their shares. Such right must be exercised within the fifteen
days following the publication in the official gazette of the company's
domicile of the resolution of the shareholders' assembly which approved
such increase.

2007]

NEW MEXICAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE

(vi) Authorization limiting the responsibility of directors and relevant
executives for damages derived from the actions taken, according
to article 33 of the L.M.V. 7
I. MANAGEMENT
The SAPI may, at the option of its shareholders, be managed according
to the provisions of the L.G.S.M. or by the corporate governance standards provided in the L.M.V. If it chooses the latter, it may be subject to
the applicable provisions of the Sociedades An6nimas Bursdtiles, governed by the L.M.V., 8 in which case the requirement of independence for
directors will not be mandatory.
II.

COMMITTEES

The board of directors, for a better performance of their duties, may
create one or more committees; the L.M.V. recommends the creation of
the audit and corporate practices committees. For the SAPI, the independence required is optional.
III.

SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENTS

In the SAPI, it is now clear that shareholder agreements can be included in its bylaws. For example:
(a) "Non-compete provisions, limited to time, subject, and location
(not to exceed three years)";
(b) Put and call options between shareholders; or
(c) "The obligation to certain shareholders to subscribe and pay for a
certain number of shares at a determined price."9
These types of corporations may purchase their own shares without being bound by the prohibition established in the L.G.S.M. for Sociedades
An6nimas.10
Finally, it is important to mention that this kind of corporation will not
be subject to the supervision of the National Banking and Securities
Commission (the Mexican equivalent to the U.S. SEC), except if it registers securities in the National Securities Registry, and that it will not have
to publish its financial statements as provided in the L.G.S.M. Furthermore, for the incorporation of a SAPI or transformation from a Sociedad
An6nima to a SAPI, there is no need for any governmental authorization,
except for the authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is a
routine procedure.
7. L.M.V., supra note 1, at art. 33. Broadly, this article refers to the damages caused
that do not derive from malicious or illicit actions.
8. Id. at arts. 22-57.
9. Id. at art. 16.
10. L.G.S.M., supra note 3, at art. 134. "It is prohibited for the Sociedades An6nimas
to purchase their own shares, except for judicial adjudication, in payment of credits
of the partnership."
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IV.

CONCLUSION

SAPI was designed to create a more protective and flexible vehicle to
raise debt and capital; this is accomplished by eliminating technical restrictions that were the sources of ambiguity previously contained in the
L.G.S.M.

